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Hard target : sanctions, inducements, and the case of North Korea / Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Studies in Asian securityPublisher: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, [2017]Copyright date: �2017Description: 1 online resource (xiii, 321 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781503601994
  • 1503601994
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Hard target.DDC classification:
  • 327.1/17095193 23
LOC classification:
  • HF1602.6
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction : the political economy of engagement -- The political economy of North Korea : the paradigmatic hard target -- North Korea's external economic relations -- The dilemmas of humanitarian assistance : the political economy of food -- The microeconomics of engagement -- Negotiating on nuclear weapons I : the rise and fall of the six party talks, 2002-2008 -- Negotiating on nuclear weapons II : permanent crisis, 2009-2015 -- Conclusion : whither North Korea? whither economic statecraft?
Summary: Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune-and even hostile-to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction : the political economy of engagement -- The political economy of North Korea : the paradigmatic hard target -- North Korea's external economic relations -- The dilemmas of humanitarian assistance : the political economy of food -- The microeconomics of engagement -- Negotiating on nuclear weapons I : the rise and fall of the six party talks, 2002-2008 -- Negotiating on nuclear weapons II : permanent crisis, 2009-2015 -- Conclusion : whither North Korea? whither economic statecraft?

Because authoritarian regimes like North Korea can impose the costs of sanctions on their citizens, these regimes constitute "hard targets." Yet authoritarian regimes may also be immune-and even hostile-to economic inducements if such inducements imply reform and opening. This book captures the effects of sanctions and inducements on North Korea and provides a detailed reconstruction of the role of economic incentives in the bargaining around the country's nuclear program. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland draw on an array of evidence to show the reluctance of the North Korean leadership to weaken its grip on foreign economic activity. They argue that inducements have limited effect on the regime, and instead urge policymakers to think in terms of gradual strategies. Hard Target connects economic statecraft to the marketization process to understand North Korea and addresses a larger debate over the merits and demerits of "engagement" with adversaries.

Online resource; title from PDF title page (JSTOR, viewed July 22, 2020).

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