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What minds can do : intentionality in a non-intentional world / Pierre Jacob.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Cambridge studies in philosophyPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997.Description: 1 online resource (xii, 299 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780511583315
  • 0511583311
  • 0511002718
  • 9780511002717
  • 9780521574013
  • 0521574013
  • 9780521574365
  • 0521574366
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: What minds can do.DDC classification:
  • 128/.2 20
LOC classification:
  • B105.I56 J33 1997eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- pt. I. The naturalization of intentionality. What is intentional realism? -- Introduction to informational semantics -- Three problems for informational semantics -- Information and teleology -- pt. II. The causal role of intentionality. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM) -- Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist? -- Functionalism and the threat of preemption -- Explaining intentional behavior -- Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology.
Summary: Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science, and psychology.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 281-294) and index.

Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or non-semantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and language, cognitive science, and psychology.

Introduction -- pt. I. The naturalization of intentionality. What is intentional realism? -- Introduction to informational semantics -- Three problems for informational semantics -- Information and teleology -- pt. II. The causal role of intentionality. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM) -- Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist? -- Functionalism and the threat of preemption -- Explaining intentional behavior -- Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology.

Print version record.

English.

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