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The political logic of economic reform in China / Susan L. Shirk.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: California series on social choice and political economy ; 24.Publication details: Berkeley : University of California Press, �1993.Description: 1 online resource (x, 399 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780520912212
  • 0520912217
  • 0585108234
  • 9780585108230
Report number: 92012030Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Political logic of economic reform in China.DDC classification:
  • 338.951 20
LOC classification:
  • HC427.92 .S55 1993eb
Other classification:
  • 15.75
  • 83.32
  • 83.13
  • 83.30
  • QG 860
Online resources:
Contents:
Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China -- pt. 1. Introduction. 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform. 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms -- pt. 2. Chinese Political Institutions. 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government. 4. Leadership Incentives: Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability. 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy. 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus. 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms -- pt. 3. Economic Reform Policy-Making. 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform. 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81. 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83. 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84. 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88 -- pt. 4. Conclusion. 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 351-384) and index.

Print version record.

Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China -- pt. 1. Introduction. 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform. 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms -- pt. 2. Chinese Political Institutions. 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government. 4. Leadership Incentives: Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability. 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy. 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus. 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms -- pt. 3. Economic Reform Policy-Making. 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform. 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81. 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83. 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84. 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88 -- pt. 4. Conclusion. 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China.

English.

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