FirstCity
Welcome to First City University College Library iPortal | library@firstcity.edu.my | +603-7735 2088 (Ext. 519)
Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

In critical condition : polemical essays on cognitive science and the philosophy of mind / Jerry Fodor.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Representation and mindPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, �1998.Description: 1 online resource (x, 219 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 0585078092
  • 9780585078090
  • 026256128X
  • 9780262561280
  • 9780262272896
  • 026227289X
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: In critical condition.DDC classification:
  • 128/.2 21
LOC classification:
  • BD418.3 .F625 1998eb
Other classification:
  • 08.36
  • 77.31
Online resources:
Contents:
pt. I. Metaphysics. Ch.1. Review of John McDowell's Mind & World. Ch.2. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization & the Metaphysics of Reduction") -- pt. II. Concepts. Ch.3. Review of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts. Ch.4. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -Not Even RED. Ch.5. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -Not Even RED. pt. 2:The Plot Thickens. Ch.6. Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. Ch.7. Review of A.W. Moore's Points of View -- pt. III. Cognitive Architecture. Ch.8. Review of Paul Churchland's The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Ch.9. Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work/J. Fodor & B. McLaughlin. Ch.10. Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work.
Ch. 11. There & Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith's Beyond Modularity. Ch. 12. Review of Jeff Elman et al., Rethinking Innateness. Ch. 13. Review of Steven Mithen's The Prehistory of the Mind -- pt. IV. Philosophical Darwinism. Ch. 14. Review of Richard Dawkins's Climbing Mount Improbable. Ch. 15. Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Ch. 16. Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland & of Alvin Plantinga. Ch. 17. Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works & Henry Plotkin's Evolution in Mind.
pt. I. Metaphysics. Ch. 1. Review of John McDowell's Mind and World. Ch. 2. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction") -- pt. II. Concepts. Ch. 3. Review of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts. Ch. 4. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -- Not Even RED. Ch. 5. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -- Not Even RED, Part 2: The Plot Thickens. Ch. 6. Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. Ch. 7. Review of A.W. Moore's Points of View -- pt. III. Cognitive Architecture. Ch. 8. Review of Paul Churchland's The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Ch. 9. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work /Jerry Fodor and Brian McLaughlin. Ch. 10. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work.
Ch. 11. There and Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith's Beyond Modularity. Ch. 12. Review of Jeff Elman et al., Rethinking Innateness. Ch. 13. Review of Steven Mithen's The Prehistory of the Mind -- pt. IV. Philosophical Darwinism. Ch. 14. Review of Richard Dawkins's Climbing Mount Improbable. Ch. 15. Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Ch. 16. Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga. Ch. 17. Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works and Henry Plotkin's Evolution in Mind.
Summary: Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism, and semantic atomism.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

"A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references (pages 215-216) and index.

Print version record.

English.

pt. I. Metaphysics. Ch.1. Review of John McDowell's Mind & World. Ch.2. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization & the Metaphysics of Reduction") -- pt. II. Concepts. Ch.3. Review of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts. Ch.4. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -Not Even RED. Ch.5. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -Not Even RED. pt. 2:The Plot Thickens. Ch.6. Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. Ch.7. Review of A.W. Moore's Points of View -- pt. III. Cognitive Architecture. Ch.8. Review of Paul Churchland's The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Ch.9. Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work/J. Fodor & B. McLaughlin. Ch.10. Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work.

Ch. 11. There & Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith's Beyond Modularity. Ch. 12. Review of Jeff Elman et al., Rethinking Innateness. Ch. 13. Review of Steven Mithen's The Prehistory of the Mind -- pt. IV. Philosophical Darwinism. Ch. 14. Review of Richard Dawkins's Climbing Mount Improbable. Ch. 15. Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Ch. 16. Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland & of Alvin Plantinga. Ch. 17. Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works & Henry Plotkin's Evolution in Mind.

pt. I. Metaphysics. Ch. 1. Review of John McDowell's Mind and World. Ch. 2. Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years (A Reply to Jaegwon Kim's "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction") -- pt. II. Concepts. Ch. 3. Review of Christopher Peacocke's A Study of Concepts. Ch. 4. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -- Not Even RED. Ch. 5. There Are No Recognitional Concepts -- Not Even RED, Part 2: The Plot Thickens. Ch. 6. Do We Think in Mentalese? Remarks on Some Arguments of Peter Carruthers. Ch. 7. Review of A.W. Moore's Points of View -- pt. III. Cognitive Architecture. Ch. 8. Review of Paul Churchland's The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Ch. 9. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work /Jerry Fodor and Brian McLaughlin. Ch. 10. Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work.

Ch. 11. There and Back Again: A Review of Annette Karmiloff-Smith's Beyond Modularity. Ch. 12. Review of Jeff Elman et al., Rethinking Innateness. Ch. 13. Review of Steven Mithen's The Prehistory of the Mind -- pt. IV. Philosophical Darwinism. Ch. 14. Review of Richard Dawkins's Climbing Mount Improbable. Ch. 15. Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin. Ch. 16. Is Science Biologically Possible? Comments on Some Arguments of Patricia Churchland and of Alvin Plantinga. Ch. 17. Review of Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works and Henry Plotkin's Evolution in Mind.

Doing philosophy, according to Jerry Fodor, is like piloting: The trick is to find an object of known position and locate yourself with respect to it. In this book, Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Fodor constructs a version of the representational theory of mind that blends intentional realism, computational reductionism, nativism, and semantic atomism.

eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide