TY - BOOK AU - Rovner,Joshua TI - Fixing the facts: national security and the politics of intelligence T2 - Cornell studies in security affairs SN - 9780801463136 AV - JK468.I6 R687 2011 U1 - 327.1273 23 PY - 2011/// CY - Ithaca PB - Cornell University Press KW - Intelligence service KW - Political aspects KW - United States KW - National security KW - POLITICAL SCIENCE KW - Government KW - International KW - bisacsh KW - International Relations KW - General KW - Diplomatic relations KW - fast KW - Foreign relations KW - 1945-1989 KW - 1989- KW - Electronic book KW - Electronic books N1 - Includes bibliographical references and index; A basic problem : the uncertain role of intelligence in national security -- Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations -- Policy oversell and politicization -- The Johnson administration and the Vietnam estimates -- The Nixon administration and the Soviet strategic threat -- The Ford administration and the Team B affair -- Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq -- Politics, politicization, and the need for secrecy N2 - What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous consequences. In Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war. -- Book jacket UR - https://libproxy.firstcity.edu.my:8443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1487772 ER -